FILED: October 31, 199
SUPREME COURT OF THE
DOMINION OF MELCHIZEDEK
 CASE ##: 001/10/31/98

David E. Robinson, in pro per
Petitioner and Plaintiff,
P.O. Box 888
Bakersville, N.C. 28705
Phone: 828-588-9056, E-mail: dr@trmi.com

________________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DOMINION OF MELCHIZEDEK

________________________________________________________________________

David Robinson, individually,          }      Petition for Relief and Restitution

and on behalf of:                               }

The will of Mary Baker Eddy,         } COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD AND DAMAGES

her (hidden) successor,                     }

Christian Scientists in every             }

country, and mankind                      }

Petitioners and Plaintiffs                   }

                                                          }

vs.                                                     }

                                                          }

Olga Chaffee, Virginia Harris,         }

John Selover, Anthony Periton,        }

Walter Jones, directors of and         }

The Board of Directors of the          }

First Church of Christ, Scientist,      }

Boston, Massachusetts A.K.A.         }

The "Mother Church",                       }

                                                          }

Respondents and Defendants             }

Now come the Petitioners and Plaintiffs, by and through David Robinson in his capacity as a member of the First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston (Mother Church), citizen of the Dominion of Melchizedek, individually and on behalf of all Christian Scientists throughout the world, The Will of Mary Baker Eddy, Founder, Discoverer, Pastor Emeritus and Leader of the Christian Science Movement including all "branch churches" of Christian Science, Her (hidden) Successor, to complain and petition the Court for relief as follows:

PRAYER FOR JUSTICE, RELIEF, AND RESTITUTION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PETITION in behalf of Mary Baker Eddy, myself, and others, is to provide the court with information that will enable it to make an accurate judgement against the Directors of The First Church of Christ, Scientist [hereinafter the "Church"], in Boston, Massachusetts, for breach of Real Estate Trusts, breach of the Last Will and Testament of Mary Baker Eddy, fraudulent usurpation of a church organization, collusion, and fraud on the courts.

I. OVERVIEW

THE CHURCH WAS FOUNDED IN 1892 by the Reverend Mary Baker Eddy through the creation of a legal deed of trust conveying to four individuals the property on which the Church was to be built. Mrs. Eddy is known as the Discoverer and Founder of Christian Science, the Leader of the Christian Science Movement and the Pastor Emeritus of the Church. The Trustees of the 1892 deed of trust, also known as the Christian Science Board of Directors, built the original Church building in 1894. In 1895, Mrs. Eddy wrote and published the first Manual of the Church, which she subsequently revised and reprinted on numerous occasions.

Subsequent deeds of trust conveyed property adjacent to the original edifice of the Church to the legal Board of Directors acting as trustees, up through the year 1904 for the purpose of constructing an extension to the existing church edifice.

When Mrs. Eddy passed on in 1910, she left a comprehensive plan for the dissolution of the worldwide Christian Science church organization known as "The Mother Church." The operative edition of the Manual, together with incorporated deeds of trust, worked to terminate this organization leaving in its place the local church in Boston known as The First Church of Christ, Scientist. At the time of Mrs. Eddy’s passing, the five extant Directors seized control of the worldwide organization by fraudulently representing themselves to the Christian Science field as Mrs. Eddy’s successors.

Without legal or ecclesiastical authority, the Directors perpetuated the worldwide Church for their own personal gain and glory. All Directors since 1910 have perpetuated this fraudulent scheme, portraying themselves to the public as the legitimate ecclesiastical authority within the Mother Church. The presumptive Board of Directors has also perpetrated its fraud upon the courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the course of numerous lawsuits by carefully manipulating evidence pertaining to the foundational documents of the Church. In some cases, other parties apparently colluded with the Directors to insulate important foundational documents from judicial construction.

Members of the First Church of Christ, Scientist and the Christian Science field have generally remained unaware of the fraudulently perpetuated organization. Only in recent years have a few individuals managed to bring this information to light.

II. CHURCH FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS.

The Manual of The First Church of Christ, Scientist and the deeds of trust executed between 1892 and 1904, constitute Mrs. Eddy’s carefully coordinated plan to decentralize the Christian Science movement upon her death. In order to recognize the continuity and cohesiveness of Mrs. Eddy’s plan, one must read the interrelated documents together. None of these documents is susceptible to a correct construction in isolation. The law of trusts as propounded by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court permits such an overview of related instruments in order to determine the intent of the founder. Indeed, the court has preconditioned judicial construction of a trust on consideration of the attendant circumstances. Every written instrument is construed with a view to all the material circumstances of the parties at the time of its execution, in the light of the pertinent facts within the knowledge of those who signed it and in such manner as to give effect to the main end designed to be accomplished by the instrument." Eustace v. Dickey, 132 N.E. 852, 857, 240 Mass. 55, 72 (1921) (citations omitted).

Logically, it follows that interrelated instruments must be construed in conjunction with one another, rather than in isolation. In Eustace, the Court emphasized the necessary construction of trust instruments so "as to give effect to the intent of the founder of the trust as manifested by the words used in the light of all the surrounding facts . . ." Id. (emphasis added).

The intent of Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the public charitable trusts which formed the legal basis of her Church, is evident in the Church deeds of trust, the Church Manual including its By-laws, and in Mrs. Eddy’s instructions to her followers. Mrs. Eddy also expressed her general intent regarding material church organization in her writings. For instance, she stated that material organization is "requisite only in the earliest periods in Christian history," and that after it has "accomplished its end, continued organization retards spiritual growth, and should be laid off . . ." Mary Baker Eddy, Retrospection and Introspection, 45 (1891). For this reason, Mrs. Eddy closed her teaching institution — The Massachusetts Metaphysical College — at the zenith of its prosperity. Id. at 47-49.

A. Deeds of Trust.

On September 1, 1892, before her church was formed, Mrs. Eddy conveyed by deed of trust a lot of land, then valued at $20,000.00, to [four individuals], Ira O. Knapp, William B. Johnson, Joseph S. Eastaman, and Stephen A. Chase and to their successors in office as trustees, to be known as the "Christian Science Board of Directors." Mary Baker Eddy, Church Manual of The First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, Mass. 8 (89th ed., 1910) [hereinafter, Manual]. See also Mary Baker Eddy, Miscellaneous Writings, 139 (1896). Conditions of the trust included that the trustees construct a church [building] on the premises of the lot and maintain the public worship of Christian Science. Manual at 131. This deed of trust established the [four member] Board as a self-perpetuating body.

The Church described in the deed of trust is a local church: "[t]he congregation which shall worship in said church shall be styled ‘The First Church of Christ, Scientist.’" Manual at 132 (emphasis added). The deed limited the ecclesiastical authority of the trustees to overseeing religious services in the Boston Church.

Between October 23, 1896 and March 3, 1904, an additional thirteen deeds of trust were executed by various individuals, conveying land to the same four-member Board of Directors as trustees. Notably, the final ten deeds of trust in this group conveyed property to the original four-member Board of Directors even after the Church Manual had been revised to establish a five-member ecclesiastical Board of Directors and after the fifth Director (Archibald McClellan) had already been appointed. Not one of the deeds of trust, however, alluded to a fifth Director or mentioned Mr. McClellan. These same ten deeds of trust also included the further express trust "that no new Tenant or By-law shall be adopted nor any Tenant or By-law be amended or annulled" absent Mrs. Eddy’s written consent or written request by at least two-thirds of the Executive Members. Helen M. Wright, If Mary Baker Eddy’s Manual Were Obeyed, page 206-15 (1989) (reproduction of deeds of trust) [hereinafter If]. Mrs. Eddy similarly enjoined the adoption of new by-laws, as well as the amendment and annulment of existing by-laws, in a separate Manual by-law to that effect. Manual at 105. The Executive Members were abolished in 1908, therefore, at Mrs. Eddy’s passing the existing by-laws became irrevocable and unalterable. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized Mrs. Eddy’s reservation of power to herself to change the by-laws and that since Mrs. Eddy’s death there can be no changes in the Manual. Eustace v. Dickey, 132 N.E. 852, 857, 240 Mass. 55, 72 (1921). By making irrevocability and unalterability of the Church manual by-laws a further condition of the deeds of trust which grounded her Church, Mrs. Eddy transformed the Manual into a legal instrument. Following execution of these ten deeds of trust, the adoption of new by-laws and amendment or annulment of existing by-laws, without Mrs. Eddy’s consent, constituted a breach of trust.

On the first page of the Church by-laws, a footnote reverences the 1892 deed of trust for a discussion of the Board of Directors as a corporate body under the Public Statutes of Massachusetts. Manual at 25, 130. This deed of trust, along with one dated March 20, 1903, is incorporated by reference into the Manual.

Both incorporated deeds convey property to the four-member Christian Science Board of Directors, although one named member had changed in the interim. Id. at 136, 137. As already mentioned, Mr. McClellan — appointed fifth Director in February, 1903 — is noticeably absent from the list of trustees. Mr. McClellan had complained to Mrs. Eddy about not being named a Director in the deeds of trust, but Mrs. Eddy informed him that it would be legally impossible to name him because the trusts were nonamendable. If. at 168. It was imperative that McClellan not be added to the trusts in order to maintain the distinction between the four-member legal Board of Directors established in the trusts, and the five-member ecclesiastical Board established by the Manual in 1903. This distinction is clarified by the cross references between the Manual and the deeds of trust just mentioned. Moreover, the incorporated deeds of trust evidence and ensure the continuity of the four-member Board of Directors.

Against this backdrop, the by-laws regarding Church Directors as "Officers" take on a distinct significance. Article I, §5 of the Manual states that the Board "shall consist of five members." Manual at 26. This Board is notably not self-perpetuating: members fill vacancies on the Board "after the candidate is approved by the Pastor Emeritus," Mary Baker Eddy. Id. (emphasis added). Mrs. Eddy’s approval is thus required to fill any vacancy on the five-member Board.

The plain meaning of this by-law is that whenever Mrs. Eddy is no longer personally present to approve a candidate, the vacancy may not be filled. The clear intent of the Founder demands that when she is unavailable to approve candidates, the Directors should rely on her default provisions indicated in the footnoted Manual reference to incorporation of the four-member self-perpetuating Board of the 1892 Deed of Trust.

B. The Estoppel Clauses.

The by-law pertaining to the appointment of Directors is one of many in which Mrs. Eddy, as Founder of the Church, its pastor Emeritus, and as author of the Manual, reserved to herself specific authority or powers. The Manual clauses designating such reserved authority to Mrs. Eddy have become known in the Christian Science movement as "estoppel clauses." Helen M. Wright, Mary Baker Eddy’s Church Manual and "Church Universal and Triumphant", 16 (1981) [hereinafter Church Universal]. The purpose of such clauses was to limit the authority for certain activity to Mrs. Eddy’s lifetime, and to estop such activity after she passed on. In total, the Manual includes more than thirty such reservations of authority. Id. at 44.

Each of these limiting clauses requires either Mrs. Eddy’s presence, consent, approval or written consent. Id. For instance, election of the President is dependent upon the approval of the Pastor Emeritus. Manual at 25. On the other hand, Article I §3 of the by-laws requires the "consent of the Pastor Emeritus given in her own handwriting" to confirm the election of the Treasurer and Clerk. Id. at 26. Article XXXIII §1 is equally emphatic in requiring the "consent of the Pastor Emeritus given in her own handwriting" in order to appoint a Committee on Publication. Id. at 97. Similarly, Mrs. Eddy’s written approval is required for nominees to be eligible for appointment to the Committee on Business. Id. at 79. Estoppel clauses also condition Manual provisions for the election of Readers, the publication of Christian Science literature, the teaching of Christian Science, the Board of Education, and the Board of Lectureship.

While the degree of emphasis varies among these clauses, all require Mrs. Eddy’s personal presence in order to carry out certain Church-related functions. The estoppel clauses limit particular aspects of the Church organization to Mrs. Eddy’s lifetime, with the implication that such organizational aspects should terminate upon her decease. As noted above, the effect of the estoppel clauses in Article I §5 requiring Mrs. Eddy’s approval in order to fill a vacancy on the five-member Board is to terminate that Board at the time of Mrs. Eddy’s passing and replace it with the self-perpetuating four-member Board outlined in the 1892 Deed of Trust. The effect of the other estoppel clauses is to terminate other aspects of Church organizational structure and seriously curtail all of the trappings of the worldwide church organization upon Mrs. Eddy’s death and return the church to its local constituency, the congregation worshipping there, or in other words, the Boston congregation.

C. The Breach of Trust.

The conditioning of the 1903 deeds of trust on the further trusts of adopting no new by-law and amending or annulling no existing by-law is strong evidence that Mrs. Eddy intended her by-laws, including the reservations of power known as estoppel clauses, to be obeyed. It is also evidence that Mrs. Eddy intended the Manual to be a legal document, enforceable in courts of law and equity. To this effect, Mrs. Eddy informed her students that the Manual would be upheld "as law by law." If. at 175. Ecclesiastical portions of the Manual are distinct and severable from legal provisions, thus facilitating civil court jurisdiction. Moreover, the Manual is in plain language — its meaning is plain on its face. No ecclesiastical expertise is required to understand or enforce the legal portions of the Manual.

The Board of Directors has, nevertheless, consistently disregarded Mrs. Eddy’s plan to decentralize her Church organization. Since Mrs. Eddy’s passing in 1910, the Board has fraudulently perpetuated the worldwide Christian Science church organization. See Church Universal at xx. The Board has continued as a five-member Board despite the lack of Mrs. Eddy’s approval in filling vacancies. The Board has ignored and thereby annulled virtually all estoppel clauses in the Manual. This is in direct and blatant violation of the further trusts of the 1903 and 1904 deeds of trust requiring that no existing by-laws be annulled. A trustee commits a breach of trust whenever he violates a duty that he owes to the beneficiary. 4-A Scott & Fratcher, The Law of Trusts §201, at 442 (4th ed. 1989). The Directors violated their duties as trustees when they annulled the by-laws containing estoppel clauses. The Directors have thus committed breaches of trust in regard to these deeds.

The Board of Directors initially committed a breach of trust in June, 1911, when it elected officers without Mrs. Eddy’s consent. If. at 62. It committed a breach of trust again in 1912 when it filled the Board vacancy created by the decease of Stephen A. Chase, thus retaining a five-member Board. Id. Since that time the Board has continually committed breaches of trust by making unauthorized appointments and thereby annulling the operative by-laws. Annually, the Board has committed breaches of trust by authorizing the Treasurer to collect a per capita tax pursuant to Article 8 §13 of the Manual, when there has not been a legitimately appointed Treasurer since June, 1911. Appointment of the Treasurer requires Mrs. Eddy’s approval in her own handwriting. Manual at 26, 44.

III. THE DIRECTORS HAVE FRAUDULENTLY USURPED THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CHURCH ORGANIZATION

The Directors have fraudulently represented themselves to Church members and to the public as Mrs. Eddy’s successors and the legitimate authority within the worldwide Mother Church. They have used this misrepresentation to extend and consolidate their authority, to fraudulently continue a lawfully defunct organization and to transform it into a strictly hierarchical organization in place of the essentially democratic one envisioned by its Founder. Since 1910, the Directors have illegitimately maintained a five-member ecclesiastical Board which never was self-perpetuating. This Board had the authority to do practically nothing without Mrs. Eddy’s consent or approval and should have dissolved upon Mrs. Eddy’s death or shortly thereafter. The Directors have fraudulently perpetuated the ecclesiastical Board — their own existence — when it should have terminated eighty-eight years ago.

A. Fraud Analysis

Under Massachusetts law, the elements of fraud include a false representation of a material fact with knowledge of its falsity for the purpose of inducing another to act thereon, justifying reliance by such other, and damages. See, e.g., Mass. Cash Register, Inc. v. Comtrex Systems Corp., 901 F.Supp. 404 (1st Dist. 1995); Kusek v. Family Circle, Inc., 894 F.Supp. 522 (1st Dist. 1995).

The Directors told the Christian Science field and the world that they were Mrs. Eddy’s successors, and that the Manual authorized them to continue the Mother Church organization in Mrs. Eddy’s absence. This was a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact. The Directors knew that the Manual conferred no such authority. As early as 1903, the Directors had sought legal counsel on the possibility of overriding the estoppels. Church Universal at 54, 55. Mrs. Eddy warned them in explicit terms that they must obey the Manual — "never abandon the By-Laws." Id. at 55. The Directors, nevertheless, unhesitatingly abandoned all of the by-laws containing estoppel clauses at Mrs. Eddy’s passing. John V. Dittemore, appointed a Director in 1910, wrote many years later that the Directors had successfully maintained the fraudulent organization because they had obtained legal counsel to justify their position, AND BECAUSE NO ONE HAD CHALLENGED THEM LEGALLY. If. at 58.

The intent of the 1910 Board of Directors to deceive is well documented. Current Directors have continued to hide evidence of the initial fraud, which is sufficient for a court to presume fraudulent intent on their part. "Deception need not be direct to come within reach of the law, and declarations and conduct calculated to mislead and which do in fact mislead one who is acting reasonably, are enough to constitute fraud." Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. Brooks, 34 N.E. 2d 435, 437, 309 Mass. 52, 55 (1941). A California court has found in a church property dispute that actual fraud is presumed where one takes advantage of a trust at the expense of a confided party. Bomar v. Mt. Olive Missionary Baptist Church, 268 P. 665, 668 (Cal. 1928). In the present case, the Directors, in their capacity of trustees, are fiduciaries who have breached their trust, harming both Church members and the public.

For almost 90 years Christian Scientists have trustingly relied on the misrepresentation of the Directors that they were Mrs. Eddy’s successors. Every Board of Directors since 1910 has continued this fraudulent misrepresentation, and the membership has continually relied on statements made by the Directors regarding the authority of this Board. The members’ reliance was justifiable based on the fiduciary relationship that the Directors held to the membership.

Due to their justifiable reliance on the statement of the Directors, Christian Scientists have consistently done whatever was demanded of them by the Directors, including sending all of their cherished memoirs of Mary Baker Eddy to the Mother Church for safekeeping in the Archives, and complying with the annual per capita tax requirement.

Following Mrs. Eddy’s decease, the Directors demanded that the Christian Science field send in all correspondence from Mrs. Eddy and other memorabilia ostensibly for safekeeping. In reality, the Directors used the Archives of the Mother Church as a place to bury all evidence of their fraud. If. at 29. The Church Administration has severely restricted access to the archival materials for decades. They are secret archives. Members who responded with overwhelming enthusiasm in contributing to the archival material have not had access to them. Although such injury is not remedial, this anecdote illustrates the trust and reliance of Christian Scientists on the representations of the Directors, as well as the intent of those Directors. The Directors also attempt to cover their fraud by restricting the circulation of Christian Science literature to that which they have authorized. See Circulation of Literature, The Christian Science Journal, Nov., 1997, at 35.

Members have also sustained pecuniary injury in the amount of per capita tax paid in to what they thought was a legitimate organization, but is actually a fraudulent church organization. The money has been used in extending the fraudulent organization. Article VIII, §13 of the Manual by-laws requires every member of the Church to "pay annually a per capita tax of not less than one dollar, which shall be forwarded each year to the Church Treasurer." Manual at 44. As already mentioned, there has not been a legitimately appointed Church Treasurer since 1910. The monies collected by the Directors under color of this provision amount to millions of dollars and should be returned to the donors. Besides the restoration of funds illegitimately collected, appropriate remedies for the breach of trust and fraud include the removal of the fifth Director and all other fraudulently appointed officers, and an injunction of all unauthorized activity, such as teaching, lecturing, the Committee on Publication and the Board of Education.

B. Fraud on the Courts and Collusion

The Directors have consistently committed fraud on the tribunals before which they appeared by presenting themselves as the legitimate Board of Directors and trustees under the 1892 deed of trust, whereas they are actually an illegitimate and fraudulently perpetrated five-member ecclesiastical Board. The Directors have manipulated evidence and colluded with ostensible adversaries to withhold probative evidence of the actual Church organization. In this manner, the Directors have collected, over the years, judicial determinations, founded on misinformation, to support their claims.

Most recently, in Weaver v. Wood, the Directors presented themselves as the supreme hierarchical authority of the Christian Science movement. The parties, moreover, agreed at the outset that specific Church documents, the Manual and Deeds of Trust of 1892 and 1898 governed their controversy. Brief for appellant at 4, Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E. 2d 918 Mass. 270 (1997) (SJC-07156). The parties decided in advance of a trial to limit any inquiry into Church organizational structure to the parameters of these three documents, thus precluding the courts from delving into related instruments, such as the 1903 and 1904 Deeds of Trust, judicial consideration of which would have elucidated the issues and aided a correct understanding of Church polity. The fact that the parties concurred in omitting probative evidence suggests a secret "understanding" or agreement between purported adversaries as collusion. Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959); Tomiyasu v. Golden, 400 P.2d 415, 417 (Nev. 1965).

Ostensible opponents collude in order to defraud an individual or to obtain an illegal object. Id. In Weaver v. Wood, one object of the parties was to renew the judicial imprimatur on a fraudulently perpetuated organizational structure. Their fraud was on the Superior Court, the Appeals Court and finally the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The parties were misleading the courts.

The parties were successful in that the Weaver court reiterated in dicta the earlier erroneous conclusion of the Eustace court that the entire management of the Church passed into the Directors’ hands at Mrs. Eddy’s death. Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 920, 425 Mass. 270 (1997). The main reason for this error is that — due to the parties’ agreement to sanitize the evidence — the Court did not have before it all necessary documents.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found "fraud on the court" where "a party tampers with the fair administration of justice by deceiving institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, or otherwise abusing or undermining the integrity of the judicial process." Rockdale Management Co,. Inc. v, Shawmut Bank, N.A., 638 N.E.2d 29, 31, 418 Mass. 596, 598, (1994). The plaintiff must show through clear and convincing evidence that the fraudulent conduct is part of a pattern or scheme to defraud. Id. The parties in Weaver were undoubtedly aware of discrepancies between the requirements of Church foundational documents and actual Church polity, due to the publicity such inconsistencies had recently received in books and papers circulated within the Christian Science field. The parties decided to limit the trial court’s consideration of Church documents to those which supported the current organization, rather than to include the related instruments that would have revealed an entirely different structure contemplated by Mary Baker Eddy. This manipulation of documentary evidence to legitimize a false Church organization misled the Court and thus undermined the integrity of the judicial process.

The Directors also committed a fraud on the courts in 1913 by representing themselves to a New Hampshire Probate Court as the Christian Science Board of Directors under the deed of trust of 1892, in order to be declared the trustees under Mrs. Eddy’s will. If. at 64-c. The 1913 Directors were actually a fraudulently perpetuated temporary Board that had been created by Mrs. Eddy to manage Mother Church business only during her lifetime. The residue of Mrs. Eddy’s estate was not left to them, but to The First Church of Christ, Scientist under the direction of the four-member Board. After consolidating her plan, as embodied in the 1903 and 1904 Deeds of Trust and Manual, to decentralize the Christian Science movement, Mrs. Eddy also amended her will by codicil which changed the residuary legatee from The Mother Church to The First Church of Christ, Scientist. Church Universal at 180. The Directors kept this fact from the Probate Court, so the Court remained unaware of any distinction between the residuary legatee of the codicil and that of the will. Id. at 132-g.

IV. IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR CIVIL COURTS TO TAKE JURISDICTION DESPITE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

The First Amendment severely curtails civil jurisdiction of ecclesiastical questions. "The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, permits hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters." Wheeler v, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, 389 N.E.2d 966, 968, 378 Mass. 58, 61 (1979).

(quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976). The general rule is that civil courts defer to the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals, where such tribunals can be identified as part of an hierarchical church. See.e.g., Serbian 426 U.S. at 708, 713; Wheeler, 389 N.E.2d at 968, 378 Mass. at 61, 62. The Constitution demands that civil courts accept "decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." Serbian, 426 U.S. at 713. The United States supreme Court has indicated possible exceptions to this rule for allegations of fraud or collusion. Id. The Serbian Court discarded the possibility of an exception for arbitrariness, "in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations . . ." Id. The "marginal civil court review" left open in Serbian would permit civil courts to take jurisdiction of a case based on the issues under consideration here. The fraud perpetrated by the Christian Science Board of Directors falls within this exception to the Constitutional mandate.

In circumscribing the jurisdiction of civil courts in religious matters, the First Amendment gives churches the Constitutional right to construe their own church laws. Larsen v, Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253-55 (1982). Such a right, however, does not allow ecclesiastical authorities to manipulate church laws to create a fraudulent organization and to hide the evidence of their fraud. In the instant case, the right to construe church laws does not give the Directors of the local Church the right to fraudulently usurp the administration of the worldwide Mother Church when Church foundational documents legally dissolved such church at the Founder’s passing. The fraudulent seizure and perpetuation of this worldwide organization lies outside the Constitutional ban of the religion clauses extending to civil court construction of church polity and authorizes a limited inquiry into the strictly legal portions of foundational documents. The Directors cannot be permitted a monopoly on the construction of church documents whereby they fraudulently derive their own authority.

A. The Fraud Exception

The United States Supreme Court first mentioned exceptions to the Constitutional mandate of civil court deference to the decisions of hierarchical church tribunals in Gonazales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). There, the Court said:

"In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise." Id. The Court found no evidence of arbitrariness, collusion, or fraud, so the exceptions were inapplicable in Gonzalez. Id. The Serbian court later eliminated the exception for arbitrariness. 426 U.S. at 712. The supreme Court has never actually applied an exception for fraud or collusion to a case under review. Other jurisdictions have nevertheless recognized a "fraud" exception.

In Hutchinson v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit Court of appeals, without finding any basis for intervention in a case of enforced clerical retirement, further narrowed the possible exception to "fraud or collusion of the most serious nature undermining the very authority of the decision-making body." 789 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1986). This is precisely the type of fraud engaged in by the Directors in the instant case. The Directors’ fraud undermines the authority of the decision-making body (the Board of Directors) because it illegitimately transforms the decision-making body into an ecclesiastical tribunal and the Church into a catholic hierarchy, thus shielding itself from civil intervention, whereas Church foundational documents leave the Board of Directors a mere overseer of religious services in a local Christian Science church.

In a much earlier case, the Supreme Court of Washington also recognized an exception to the constitutional ban of the religion clauses for fraud undermining the authority of the decision-making body. Hendryx v, People’s United Church of Spokane, 84P. 1123 (Wash. 1906). In Hendryx, the Court overturned ecclesiastical expulsions because they were part of a "fraudulent scheme to expel . . . members for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining control of the property of the organization, and diverting it from its original channel." Id. at 1126. A fraudulent scheme is also at the heart of this present matter. The Directors’ scheme is to perpetuate a worldwide Church organization that was legally dissolved 88 years ago.

In expounding the rule of church/state separation, the Hendryx court outlined the parameters for civil court review of ecclesiastical issues: "to inquire whether it is a church and whether the tribunal which has acted is the one endowed with power in the premises by the church." Id. at 1125. Such a contracted review would still not leave the instant Directors unscathed, because they are not the tribunal empowered by the Church (i.e. by the Manual and the deeds of trust.).

Similarly, in Bouldin v. Alexander, 82, U.S. 132 (1872), a small minority of a black church in the district of Columbia purported to excommunicate a large majority and took over the property of the church. The Court held that civil courts can’t inquire whether individuals have been regularly or irregularly excommunicated, but said courts may inquire whether the expulsion was the action of the church, or of persons who were not the church, and who, consequently, had no right to expel anyone. Id. at 140. By analogy, civil courts should be able to inquire whether the actions of the instant Directors, such as declaring themselves Mrs. Eddy’s successors, assessing a per capita tax, teaching, lecturing, and so forth are actions of the Church or of a renegade Board without authority.

B. Freedom to act is not absolute

The allowance of civil court jurisdiction, despite religious issues, in cases of fraud, is part of a broader First Amendment exclusion for actions inimical to the public interest. In the interest of the commonwealth, religious activity may be regulated. In Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-69 (1944), the United States Supreme Court upheld State regulation of the distribution of religious pamphlets by children. The court had earlier established that the Constitutional guarantee of a free exercise of religion did not insulate individuals from criminal prosecution of bigamy. David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1889); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

In Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, the supreme Court distinguished between the freedom to believe and the freedom to act, both concepts being embraced in the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 310 U.S. 296, 303, (1940). "The first [concept] is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 304. The court went on: "[n]othing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public." Id. at 306. The Court alluded to fraudulent solicitation, indicating that a state may constitutionally require solicitors to identify themselves and their cause, but striking down the state licensing of solicitors as an infringement of the First Amendment. Id. at 307. More recently, in United States v. Ballard, the Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between an absolute freedom of belief and a conditional freedom to act. 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). In Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. of the United Methodist Church v. Super.Ct., of Dal,. County of San Diego, Justice Rehnquist expounded upon the less than absolute freedom to act, denying an application for a stay pending review on certiorari. 439 U.S. 1371, 1374 (1978). Justice Rehnquist indicated that constitutional constraints on the extent to which a civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in adjudicating interchurch disputes do not similarly apply outside the context of such disputes. Id. at 1372. This is because the apparent dangers of state entanglement in religious controversies or intervention on behalf of a particular religious faction do not obtain outside the context of interchurch disputes. Id. at 1373. "Such considerations are not applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged." Id.

The present controversy concerns the actions of the Directors, not their beliefs. The Directors have committed a breach of trust in their administration of a public charitable trust. They have committed frauds upon the public. The Directors should not be permitted to shield their fraudulent activity under the cloak of church polity. As in the cases just cited, the controversy here is not an interchurch dispute, although the relator is a Christian Scientists. The crux of this dispute is secular. The focus of this dispute is on protecting the public interest from the actions of an illegitimate church organization. In such a case, the constitutional constraints of Serbian do not apply.

C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS FROM A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION IN A SECULAR DISPUTE

The First District Court of Appeals has placed stringent limitations on State discovery where there is a danger of doctrinal entanglement. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Dist. 1979). Surinach is, however, distinguishable from the instant case. Surinach involved an ongoing state regulatory scheme for private schools. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico demanded financial records of a parochial school as part of its investigation into the operating costs of private schools. Id. at 74. Besides constituting an ongoing encroachment, the discovery request was made based on a State regulation. Id. The gathering of records was not an end in itself, but rather a first step, with a potential for future public hearings and regulation. Id. at 75. The subpoenas which generated this controversy sought extremely detailed information about the expenditures of funds by these Roman Catholic schools. Id. at 78. The Court reasoned that the ongoing and public nature of the investigation gave it self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensities indicative of an increased danger of unconstitutional entanglement. Id. The instant case doesn’t have the self- perpetuating propensities of Surinach nor does it involve state inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization or other indicia of forbidden entanglement. Discovery in the present dispute would not lead into a regulatory scheme, but rather would be an end in itself.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts has held that a debtor church failed to establish a First Amendment privilege based upon religious freedoms, in the context of discovery, due to the claimant’s allegations of fraud and undue influence in a private dispute. In re The Bible speaks, 69 B.R. 643, 657 (Bkrtcy.D.Mass. 1987). The court emphasized that a litigant carries a heavy burden in establishing an evidentiary privilege, even one based on the First Amendment. Id. The claimant urged that the issues be reviewed in the context of the entire pattern of conduct of the Debtor’s representative, and when so viewed they constituted conduct which was not entitled to protection. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). Likewise, the present claim of fraud, fraud on the courts, and breach of trust are sufficient to overcome any evidentiary privilege based on the First Amendment. Similarly, the instant issues, when viewed in the context of the entire pattern of conduct of the Directors, constitute conduct not entitled to protection. The Bankruptcy Court is not present in purely secular disputes where fraud is alleged. Id. at 648 Discovery of documents from a religious organization was also available in Hitchinson v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905 (Pa.Super. 1992). The court in Hutchinson ordered the discovery of documents pertaining to priests’ sexual misconduct from secret archival files of a Roman Catholic church. Discovery should be equally available from the secret archival files of The First Church of Christ, Scientist, where the Directors have buried documentation of their fraudulent usurpation of the church organization.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has allowed discovery of documents in a tort claim against church officials for inducement to breach a physician’s duty of confidentiality. Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 123, 395 Mass. 59, 74 (1985). A minister’s superiors had induced the minister’s physician to breach the duty of patient-physician confidentiality owed to the minister and allegedly used the information so obtained to fail to reappoint the minister. 479 N.E.2d

at 116, 395 Mass. at 62. The court held that the First Amendment did not preclude the imposition of liability on the church officials for inducing a physician’s breach of confidentiality, despite church documents authorizing such action, nor did it bar judicial inquiry into church proceedings culminating in the minister’s failure to gain reappointment. 479 N.E.2d at 121-23, 395 Mass. at 72-74. The Court reasoned that discovery and trial evidence bearing on the issue of whether the failure to reappoint resulted from the official’s tortious actions, would not involve "repetitious inquiry or continuing surveillance that would amount to the excessive entanglement between government and religion that the First Amendment prohibits." 479 N.E.2d at 123, 395 Mass. at 75. Similarly, discovery relating to whether the Directors have committed specific acts of fraud would involve neither repetitious inquiry not continuing surveillance.

Discovery should be permitted in this case for the same reason that civil courts should take jurisdiction, because the dispute is essentially secular. There can be no impermissible entanglement of state and religious doctrine in a secular dispute. The issues in this dispute are not ecclesiastical. Whether there is a breach of trust is a secular question. The foundational documents involved are

legal instruments, recorded in the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds. Whether the Directors have fraudulently usurped the Christian Science organization is not strictly a question of church polity, but rather an issue of the tortious activity of Church officers.

Although the constitutional ban of the religion clauses extends to civil court construction of polity, it should be permissible for civil courts to make a limited inquiry into the foundational documents in order to determine whether the Directors have fraudulently seized and perpetuated an organization that was intended by the Founder to dissolve at her passing. As previously noted, this can be accomplished by looking at only the "legal" portions of the documents, as opposed to the "ecclesiastical" portions.

D. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW APPLY TO THIS CONTROVERSY

Serbian and Wheeler, cases which severely circumscribe the civil court jurisdiction of religious issues, only apply explicitly to hierarchical church organization. See 426 U.S. at 713 and 389 N.E.2d at 968, 378 Mass. at 62, respectively. The implication exists that civil courts have more jurisdictional latitude when the questions arise in a church organization that is not hierarchical, but rather congregational or of some other internal structure. Civil courts have, nevertheless, taken jurisdiction of church property disputes even in hierarchical churches, deciding the cases based on "neutral principles of law." See Jones v, Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). Compare Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 625 N.E.2d 1352, 1355-56, 416 Mass. 781, 790 (1994) (court found that plaintiffs had no legal or equitable interest in church property, although Jones v. Wolf would have allowed a neutral principles approach).

The "neutral principles of law" doctrine applies to disputes that are "secular but church-related." Laurence Tribe American Constitutional Law 1241 (2d ed. 1988). The court must take care to scrutinize documents in purely secular terms. 443 U.S. at 604. Although the doctrine has only been applied to property disputes, U.S. Supreme Court and other relevant decisions have never explicitly limited application of the doctrine to such disputes. There is thus no reason to doubt the aptness of the doctrine in a secular but church-related dispute as this one.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has attempted to narrow the applicability of this doctrine strictly to church property disputes. Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6thCir. 1986). The Appeals Court has misconstrued Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), as so limiting the "neutral principles of law" doctrine. The Jones court said: "there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded." Id. at 599. The Supreme Court never limited the application of such principles to property disputes. The present controversy is secular but church-related, and therefore amenable to the application of neutral principles of the laws of trust and tort.

The danger of civil courts abridging First Amendment rights is most salient in hierarchical churches. In Wheeler, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the First Amendment has also placed stringent limitation on the role of civil courts in resolving church property disputes, particularly following Serbian. 389 N.E.2d at 969, 378 Mass. at 63. The Court suggested that civil courts might be less hesitant to comment on whether a civil court could take jurisdiction if the hierarchical church had no ecclesiastical tribunal. 389 N.E.2d at 968, 378 Mass, at 62 n.3.

The First Church of Christ, Scientist, is not an hierarchical church. At Mrs. Eddy’s passing, foundational documents of the Church left only a local Boston church and local Societies around the world, with no legitimate worldwide Mother Church organization. Existing branch churches should have continued for a time and then gradually disappeared. See If, 43-45. The hierarchical Christian Science organization, apparent in Boston and branch churches throughout the world, is illegitimate, fraudulently continued after Mrs. Eddy’s passing. It is only a hierarchy due to the fraud of its Directors. There is no authority for such an organization in the Church founding documents; these documents dissolved the hierarchical church. Similarly, the Church has no valid ecclesiastical tribunal; founding documents have dissolved the one that existed in 1910. Courts are not obliged to defer to the decisions of a fraudulent ecclesiastical tribunal or polity-construing board of the Church, particularly when the Church is not clearly hierarchical.

Massachusetts courts have found that in voluntary associations, such as churches, members acquiesce to the apparent mode of administration. See, e.g., Attorney General v. First Congregational Society in Raynham v. Trustees, 23 Pick. 148 (Mass. 1839). Such decisions are inapposite here. Although the instant Church is a voluntary association, that does not give the Directors license to usurp the organization and transform it into an hierarchical church in order to insulate themselves from judicial action. If members and Directors want an hierarchical church, they are free to create their own organization, but they have no right to convert Mrs. Eddy’s church to their own purposes.

E. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT COUNTENANCE BRUTE FORCE ON THE PART OF CHURCH OFFICIALS

Even if the Church were considered hierarchical, civil courts could take jurisdiction of this controversy. The First Amendment does not require blind deference of the courts to ecclesiastical decisions. Serbian has left open the possibility of exceptions to deference in cases of collusion and fraud. While the exception is narrow, it encompasses this controversy. In an eloquent dissent in Serbian, Justice Rehnquist outlined the ominous danger of courts according blind deference to ecclesiastical decisions. He warned that such deference leaves claims to be resolved by brute force. 426 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He suggested that blind deference would transform courts into the "handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness." Id. at 727. Moreover, he raised the specter of establishment clause problems if the coercive powers of civil courts were used to "rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such deference is not accorded similar acts of secular voluntary association." Id. at 734.

The Directors in this dispute have taken the Church by force. Through the years they have consolidated their domination of the Church by obtaining judicial sanction of their fraudulent organization. Civil court jurisdiction of this matter is requisite in order to avoid the dangers articulated by the honorable Justice Rehnquist.

V. THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED CHURCH POLITY IN PRIOR ADJUDICATIONS

The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth has ruled on Church polity in several cases, including Weaver v. Wood, Dittemore v. Dickey, and Eustace v. Dickey. In each of these cases, the Court seriously misstated Church polity, due to the Director’s fraud on the courts and the oversight or omission of significant documents. To the degree that these decisions express erroneous conclusions regarding Church organizational structure, they should be set aside.

The Court originally misconstrued Church polity in Eustace v. Dickey. The Court confused the two Boards of Directors, in assuming that the Manual By-law which added a fifth Director in February, 1903, changed the number of Directors from the four identified in the 1892 deed of trust. 132 N.E. at 856, 240 Mass. at 69. The Court explained: "[t]here was no rule fixing their number until February, 1903, when a by-law was adopted, which has since continued in force establishing their number at five." Id. That by-law should not, however, have continued in

force following Mrs. Eddy’s death in 1910, and it was not a rule fixing the number of Directors beyond that occurrence, because it specifically required Mrs. Eddy’s approval for the appointment of Directors. See Manual at 26.

The Eustace court also operated under the mistaken assumption that, following abolition of the First Members, Mrs. Eddy gave all power to the Directors, that "the entire management . . . passed into the hands of the Directors, a self-perpetuating body." Id. at 71. The Supreme Judicial Court has recently reiterated this misconstruction of Church foundational documents in Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d at 920, 425 Mass. at 272. In reality, Mrs. Eddy retained complete control over the management of the Church. There was very little that the Directors could do without her approval. Moreover, for as long as Mrs. Eddy was alive, the Directors were not, either in theory or practice, a self-perpetuating body; Mrs. Eddy approved all appointments to the Board. Upon Mrs. Eddy’s decease, estoppel clauses were intended to dissolve the five-member Board and its activities.

The Eustace court recognized the general effect of the estoppel clauses, indicating that the by-law (Manual at 105) which precluded the adoption of new by-laws or amendment or annulment of existing by-laws, without Mrs. Eddy’s consent, operated to estop changes in the Manual following her decease: "it is apparent that there can now, since the decease of Mrs. Eddy, be no change in the provisions of the Church Manual in accordance with its terms." 132 N.E.2d at

857, 240 Mass. at 72. The Court, however, failed to extend this recognition of the operation of estoppel clauses to Mrs. Eddy’s other reservations of power in the Manual.

All of these errors stem from the fact that the Eustace court lacked a complete picture of the Founder’s intent because it never construed the 1903 and 1904 Deeds of Trust in conjunction with the estoppel clauses. The parties, the Master, and the Court were not willing to consider the possibility that the Founder could have intended to dissolve the worldwide Church organization upon her decease. The Court thus never perceived the four-member Board of Directors as a distinct entity following appointment of the fifth Director. Although the Eustace bill in equity referenced an "amendatory deed" of March 19, 1903, 240 Mass. at 60, neither the parties nor the Court recognized the significance of this deed of trust. The Court clarified the basis of the bill and decision, as an 1898 Publishing Society deed of trust and the 1892 deed to the Directors.

Massachusetts courts have never ruled on the 1903 and 1904 deeds of trust.

In Dittemore v. Dickey, 144 N.E. 57, 249 Mass. 95 (1924), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also ignored the 1903 deed of trust, grounding its decision on the 1892 deed and the Manual. Hence, Court findings that there were not two boards, of four and five member respectively, but only one board, are incorrect. The Court made other errors. It found that the management of the Church had been in the hands of the Directors since 1901. 144 N.E. at 60, 249

Mass. at 104. Actually, Mrs. Eddy retained full control of the Church until her passing. The Court found no distinction in practice between duties assigned by the 1892 deed and duties assigned by the Manual. Id. The Court failed to recognize, however, that the powers allotted each board were vastly different. The Court reasoned erroneously that when the number of directors was increase to five, they became trustees as well. Id. at 107. Such an outcome would be impossible, given that the trust deed was nonamendable and later deeds continued to name four grantees. The Court found that the five-member Board constituted the appropriate tribunal to dismiss one of its members. Id. at 111. This finding was erroneous, because the five-member board was in reality defunct, and could thus have no authority to dismiss one of its members, unless in the attempt to

comply with the estoppel clauses, in which case, the clauses also would have precluded further appointments. This decision should also be set aside to the degree that it is erroneous.

VI. LITIGATION IN THIS CONTROVERSY WOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED BY CONCEPTS OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Prior decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would not preclude litigation of current claims — namely that the Directors have committed fraud and breaches of trust. The requirements of res judicata include a final judgment on the merits in the earlier action, identity of the cause of action in both suits, and identity of the parties of their privies in both suits. Grella v. Salem Five Cents Savings Bank, 42 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1994). The current causes of action are not identical to those of either Eustace, 240 Mass. at 60 (improper removal of trustees), or Dittemore, 249 Mass. at 97, 98 (improper dismissal director). Moreover, the plaintiffs representing the public interest —would neither be identical to nor a privy of the parties in Eustace and Dittemore, who were Directors of the Church and Trustees of the Christian SciencePublishing Society.

Collateral estoppel is likewise inapplicable to the current controversy. Although the issues of the number of members and authority of the Board of Directors have been previously decided, such decisions would not preclude relitigation of the issues in this controversy. The party asserting issue preclusion must establish that an issue of fact sought to be foreclosed actually was litigated and determined in a prior action between parties or their privies, and that the determination was essential to the decision in the prior action. Morgan v. Evans, 657 N.E.2d 764, 766, 39 Mass.App. 465, 467 (1995).

The number and authority issues in the present controversy are distinct from those in earlier cases. These issues were originally raised in the context of the authority of the Board to dismiss a Publishing Society Trustee or a Director, without questioning the fundamental legitimacy of the Board of Directors to administer the Church. The current controversy raises the issue of

two distinct Boards as a challenge to the very existence of a five-member Board.

The parties to the present controversy are also distinct from parties to previous adjudications. Identity of parties may be established by showing that parties from the first suit are "privies" of parties to the second suit, or that strangers to the first action permitted parties to act as their representatives. Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-op. Bank, 386 N.E.2d 775, 779, 7 Mass.App. 153, 157-58 (1979). The current controversy presents no identity of parties with either Eustace or Dittemore because the Petitioners, relators and the public are not privies of and did not agree to representation by the Directors and Trustees of the 1920’s.

In Massachusetts, the right to challenge a judgement collaterally is limited to strangers to the earlier proceedings whose interests have been affected thereby. Parlik v, Dmytryck, 379 N.E.2nd 1117, 1118, 6 Mass.App. 915 (1978). Incidental to an action against the Directors for fraud and breach of trust, we have the right to attack the erroneous decisions stemming from prior adjudications on the issue of the authority and number of Directors.

VII. PURPOSE OF THIS PETITION

Since the Attorney General can also correct abuses in the administration of a public charity, I am not filing this petition because a charitable trust has been fraudulently avoided --- which indeed it has, --- I AM FILING THIS PETITION IN CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE CHURCH AND THEIR PREDECESSORS SINCE MRS. EDDY’S PASSING IN 1910, -- AND AS A PETITION FOR REDRESS OF THEIR BREACHES OF REAL ESTATE TRUSTS, BREACH OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF MARY BAKER EDDY, FRAUDULENT USURPATION OF A CHURCH ORGANIZATION, COLLUSION, AND FRAUD.

VIII. JURISDICTION.

This Court holds jurisdiction over the matters relevant to this action for the following reasons:

1. It is the Will of Mary Baker Eddy
2. It is the Will of God
3. DOM is an eternal sovereignty based on the Bible and further inspired by the teachings of Mary Baker Eddy, therefore this court is the highest ecclesiastical authority on earth for Christian Scientists; however this Court is also a civil court.
4. Both the Mother Church and DOM are universal. This matter is an international case and therefore must be resolved in an international court such as this Court.
5. Melchizedek and its courts exercise "dominion from sea to shining sea". (See 51 page legal opinion found on the Internet at: http://www.melchizedek.com/legal.htm )
6. Due to its headquarters being located in Boston, The Board of Directors of the Mother Church are free to follow the laws, rules and procedure for civil cases as would be followed if this case were brought in a Boston Superior Court or in a Federal Court of the United States of America in defending themselves from this suit in law as stipulated hereby by Plaintiffs and Petitioners herein with certain exceptions that may be imposed by this Court.
7. Pleadings, Answers, etc., and other filings with the Court must be sent by certified return receipt requested mail to:  Chief Justice Tzemach David Netzer Korem of the Supreme Court of Melchizedek C/O the Legation of Melchizedek, 985 E. Hillsdale Blvd., #202. Foster City, Ca., 94404, USA.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, I hereby petition your honorable Court to make a judgement for disclosure, relief, restoration, and damages against the current and former Directors of The First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts, for fraud, fraud on the courts, breaches of trust, breach of the last will and testament of Mary Baker Eddy, collusion, and misappropriation of funds. I further request an order of this Court which shall order the Directors of the "Mother Church" to cease and desist parading as directors of said church, and for the appointment of a receiver to oversee the winding down of the affairs of the "Mother Church".

Respectfully submitted,

David E. Robinson, in properia persona and on behalf of the

will of Mary Baker Eddy, Her (hidden) successor

Christian Scientists in every Country, and mankind,

Petitioners and Plaintiffs

David Robinson is a:

1) Member of The First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, Massachusetts.

2) Former First Reader of the Greenville Branch of The Church of Christ,

Scientist, in South Carolina (see Manual, Article 1, Section 9, p.28, last

paragraph).

3) Licensed Real Estate Salesman in the State of North Carolina.

4) Notary Public for Mitchell County in the State of North Carolina.

5) Certified Nurses Assistant in the State of North Carolina.

6) Associate Mechanical Engineer from the Lowell Institute of School of the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge Massachusetts.

7) Graduate of the General Electric Machinist and Draftsman Apprentice Training

Program at the General Electric Company in Lynn, Massachusetts.

8) Founder and Sole Proprietor of The Roan Mountain Institute of Christian

Science and Health in Bakersville, North Carolina.

9) Publisher of The Christian Science Beacon Newspaper.

10) Author of the Witness To Truth Trilogy — The Bible As Reform, The Bible As

Healing, and The Bible As History.

11) Christian Science Practitioner practicing in Bakersville, North Carolina.

12) The Society of Christ, Chairman